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Most commentators agree that Supreme
Court jurisprudence with respect to Fifth
Amendment takings is a confusing area of law.
In fact, one has gone so far as to call it
"screwed up."1 The topic of this paper is, per-
haps, one of the most "screwed up" aspects of
takings law, temporary takings.
In 1987 the United States Supreme Court
decided First English Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles2 holding that "where the govern-
ment's activities have already worked a taking
of all use of property, no subsequent action by
the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during
which a taking was effective."3 This language
established the concept of a temporary taking.
The Supreme Court, however, limited the First
English decision by expressly excluding "normal
delays in obtaining building permits, changes
in zoning ordinances, and the like."4
Unfortunately, the Court did not specify exact-
ly what was meant by "normal" delay, leaving
the issue open for the lower courts.
Later, in 1992, the Court decided Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,5 establishing the
categorical rule that when a regulation
deprives land of "all economically beneficial
use," it is a taking per se.6 Prior to Lucas the
Supreme Court always used an ad hoc balanc-
ing analysis, primarily established in Penn





Law is “Screwed Up”
By Jon Lycett
 Jon Lycett graduated from the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law in 2000. Jon was West-Northwest's
Executive Editor during the 1999-2000 academic year.  He is cur-
rently an associate in a San Francisco law firm.
1. JAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY MATTERS: HOW PROPERTY RIGHTS
ARE UNDER ASSAULT AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE 282 (1997).
2. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
3. Id. at 321.
4. Id.
5. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
6. Id. at 1015-19. Justice Scalia's formulation is derived
from Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), and focuses
on the use of the property. However, he seems to use this con-
cept interchangeably with a "finding of no value." See, e.g., id. at
1020. These concepts are not the same, and some confusion has
resulted which is nicely illustrated in Landgate, Inc. v. California
Coastal Commission, 953 P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct.
179 (1998) the subject of this paper. This problem will be
explored more fully in infra Part IV.A.1.
7. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
decide regulatory takings cases. By establish-
ing a categorical rule in Lucas, the Court
intended to clarify takings law by eliminating
the uncertainty of a balancing test in some
cases.
Unfortunately, the result may have been
quite different. For example, though cases
where all economically beneficial use is denied
were supposed to be "relatively rare,"9 many
landowners feel that all use has been taken
whenever they are denied a permit.
Furthermore, the categorical rule may have
exacerbated the so-called "denominator prob-
lem."10
Thus, taken together, Lucas and First English
may have caused more problems than they
solved. Whenever a landowner is required to
get a permit before developing her property,
she can argue that the denial of that permit
renders her property without economically
beneficial use. Therefore, even if the permit is
subsequently granted, when the delay goes
beyond "normal," the period during which no
development was allowed arguably requires
compensation under Lucas and First English.11
As a result, while Lucas and First English
increase protection for important property
rights by opening the courthouse door for
many landowners who previously had no rem-
edy for regulatory abuses and administrative
stonewalling, they also create the possibility of
contentious litigation and inconsistent lower
court rulings that might significantly hinder
the government's ability to regulate develop-
ment for the long term protection of the envi-
ronment.
The main problem is that the Supreme
Court left at least two important questions
unanswered. The first question has to do with
the well-established concepts of finality and
ripeness. At exactly what point does "normal"
delay become unreasonable, and therefore
compensable? If the delay was not normal,
then when exactly did the taking occur so that
the period of the taking can be calculated? The
second question has to do with damages. What
is the appropriate measure of damages for a
temporary taking? The combination of these
two unanswered questions allows landowners
to argue that almost any delay is unreason-
able, with the hope of a substantial damages
award as incentive.
An interesting example is Landgate, Inc. v.
California Coastal Commission.12 In this 1998 case,
the California Supreme Court was presented
only with the issue of what constitutes "nor-
mal" delay. Specifically, does the mistaken
denial of a permit, which a landowner must lit-
igate to correct, require compensation under
Lucas and First English?13 The appellate court,
however, because it held that there was a tak-
ing requiring compensation, reached the dam-
ages issue as well.14 Thus, taken as a whole, the
Landgate case is a nice illustration of both the
finality/ripeness question and the damages
question.
This paper will analyze both questions
using the Landgate case as an example. Part II
will be dedicated to a detailed review of the
facts in Landgate, including the positions
argued by both Landgate, Inc. and the Coastal
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8. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
9. Id. at 1018.
10. See id. at 1016 n.7. One commentator summed up the
denominator problem as follows: "If you own 100 acres and regu-
lation makes 10 acres completely useless, have you lost 10 per-
cent of 100 acres or 100 percent of 10 acres?" See DELONG, supra
note 1, at 290. Ideally this question was answered by the "whole
parcel" rule established in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31, and
reinforced by Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 497 (1986). Unfortunately, the Lucas decision provides signif-
icant motivation for landowners to claim that they lost one hun-
dred percent of some piece of property, because that would fit
them within the categorical rule. In addition, property that has
been subdivided and sold off in portions by developers may no
longer make sense as a whole parcel. A variety of other issues can
make the whole parcel rule problematic, so some lower courts
have started to move away from it. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The effect this situa-
tion has on temporary takings will be discussed in further detail
in infra Part IV.A.2.
11. See Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1210 (Cal. 1998) (Brown, J., dis-
senting).
12. Id. at 1188 (Cal. 1998), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 179 (1998).
13. See id. at 1190.
14. See Opening Brief for Appellant California Coastal
Commission at 7-9, Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal
Commission, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (No.
B084315). The Appellate Court's decision in this case was only
certified for partial publication. Only the takings issue and a fees
issue were published and can still be found in the California
Reporter or on Westlaw. However, the damages issue was fully
briefed by the parties and decided by the court. Telephone
Interview with Joseph Barbieri, Deputy Attorney General,
California Department of Justice (Dec. 2, 1998).
cussion with an analysis of finality and
ripeness issues in order to determine exactly
when a regulatory taking occurs, and what is
"normal" delay. Part IV will analyze the appro-
priate remedies for temporary takings by dis-
cussing the various problems associated with
the calculation of damages. Finally, Part V will
conclude by suggesting some changes in tak-
ings law.
II. Facts
The Landgate case involves two pieces of
property in Los Angeles County's Malibu
Hills.15 Originally, these properties were long,
narrow lots running in a north-south direction,
with the southern portion flat and the northern
portion sloped.16 In the mid-1980's Landgate's
predecessor in interest agreed to allow the
County to construct a road bisecting the two
properties along the base of the slope.18 In
exchange, the County approved a lot line
adjustment which created a northern, sloped
2.45 acre lot above the road and a southern,
flat 1.56 acre lot below the road. There was
already a house on the southern portion, but
the lot line adjustment created a vacant lot on
the sloped northern portion, which Landgate,
Inc. purchased in October, 1990.19 Though the
County sought and received the Coastal
Commission's approval for the road, it did not
seek approval for the lot line adjustment.20
The County's failure to seek the
Commission's approval for the lot line adjust-
ment ended up causing problems for Landgate
when it tried to build a home on the property.21
The Coastal Commission has the authority to
approve development projects in the coastal
zone.22 The Coastal Act defines "development"
as "any . . . change in the density or intensity of
use of land, including . . . lot splits."23
Furthermore, the Attorney General had advised
the Commission that this definition of "devel-
opment" could include lot line adjustments
because they were a type of "lot split."24 As a
result, the Commission denied Landgate's
application because, among other things, it
concluded that the county's failure to seek its
approval for the lot line adjustment had creat-
ed an illegal lot.25
Landgate sued the Coastal Commission for
both a writ of mandate and a taking of proper-
ty without just compensation.26 The trial court
severed the two aspects of the complaint and
postponed the takings issue until after the lot
line issue had been decided.27 Landgate won a
writ of mandate in the trial court, whose ruling
was upheld by the court of appeal.28 The court's
ruling forced the Commission to recognize the
lot line adjustment, but left them with the
authority to approve the final development.29
Upon reconsideration, the Commission
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15. See Landgate, 953 P.2d 1188 at 1190.
16. See id. at 1190.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 1191.
20. See id. at 1193. See also Coastal Commission's Appellate
Court Brief at 6, Landgate (No. B084315).
21. See Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1191-92.
22. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30519 (Deering 2000). Under
§ 30519 the Commission retains this authority until it approves a
"Local Coastal Program" (LCP) created by the county. When
Landgate was applying for a development permit, the
Commission had not yet approved Los Angeles County's LCP,
and so still had jurisdiction over the development. See Landgate,
953 P.2d at 1191.
23. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30106 (Deering 2000).
24. See Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1192.
25. See id. This is the source of the "jurisdictional spat"
referred to by the appellate court. See id. at 1194. This was not the
first time the County of Los Angeles had failed to seek
Commission approval for a lot line adjustment. See id. at 1199. In
fact, one commissioner noted that it had happened "many
times," and said that it was "really time to become extremely seri-
ous about this." See id. As a result, the commission essentially
refused to consider any of Landgate's project modifications until
the lot line issue had been litigated. See id. at 1193.
26. See id. at 1192.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 1193. Both courts made their ruling based on
the facts of this case rather than the more general dispute over
the County's failure to seek the Commissions approval for the lot
line adjustment. See id. Essentially, the Commission had
approved the construction of the road, which made the lot line
adjustment necessary in the first place. See id. Later, Landgate
had purchased the property with no knowledge of the lot line
problems and with the intent to construct a house. See id. The trial
and appellate courts therefore held that the Commission could
not invalidate the lot line adjustment after an innocent purchas-
er had intervened. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
Once the Commission had granted a devel-
opment permit, both parties moved for sum-
mary judgment on the takings claim.31
Landgate argued that it was entitled to com-
pensation because it had been denied all eco-
nomically viable use of its property for a two
year period.32 The Commission countered that
the two year delay was normal because it was
the result of an erroneous interpretation of the
law, and so compensation was not required.33
Both the trial court and the court of appeal
again ruled in favor of Landgate.34
The trial court found that Landgate had
been temporarily denied all economically
viable use of its property.35 Thus, compensation
was due under the Lucas and First English
cases.36 Consequently, the court held a bench
trial on the issue of damages.37
Aside from the arguments for no damages
advanced by the Commission, the trial court
considered three methods of calculating dam-
ages for a temporary taking.38 First, Landgate
argued for damages based on the fair rental
value of the house they were unable to con-
struct.39 Second, the Commission argued for
damages based on a five percent rate of return
on the difference between the value of the
property before and after the taking.40 Finally,
the Commission also suggested a five percent
rate of return on the lost opportunity for the
entire initial investment of $675,000.41 The trial
court basically adopted the second line of rea-
soning concluding that, since the property was
rendered worthless, the difference was the
entire $675,000 market value.42 After increasing
the rate of return to ten percent, and adding
property taxes paid during the taking period,
the trial court awarded $155,657 in compensa-
tion.43 In addition, the trial court awarded
$122,395.73 in fees and costs, bringing the
total award to $278,052.73.44
The court of appeal upheld both the tak-
ings decision and the trial court's award of
damages.45 While it accepted the Commission's
argument that agencies are not liable for mis-
takes, it rejected the idea that the permit
denial was mistaken.46 The appellate court
essentially accused the Commission of using
Landgate as a pawn in an "ongoing jurisdic-
tional spat" with the County of Los Angeles.47
Following the appellate court's decision, the
Commission petitioned for review in the
California Supreme Court.48
In a 4-3 decision, the California Supreme
Court reversed.49 In the majority opinion, writ-
ten by Justice Mosk, the Court acknowledged
the force of the Lucas and First English deci-
sions.50 It avoided the impact of those deci-
sions, however, by first emphasizing the "nar-
rowness" of First English in that it did not apply
to cases of "normal" delay.51 Second, the Court
concluded that the "mere assertion of regula-
tory jurisdiction . . . does not constitute a reg-
ulatory taking."52 Even though the
Commission's assertion of jurisdiction was
erroneous and was later overturned, the Court
placed it squarely in the category of "normal"

















34. See id. at 1193-94.
35. See id. at 1193.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Coastal Commission's Appellate Court Brief at 7-9,
Landgate (No. B084315).
39. See id. at 8-9. This method resulted in a proposed
award of $744,155. See id. The fair market value of the property was
only $675,000. See id. 
40. See id. at 8.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 9. This ruling came in spite of the fact that
experts for both sides appraised the property after the
Commission's action at $337,500. See id. at 26.
43. See id. at 9. See also Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1193 (Cal.
1998).
44. See Coastal Commission's Appellate Court Brief at 9,
Landgate (No. B084315).
45. See Landgate v. California Coastal Commission, 953 P.2d
1188, 1193-94 (Cal. 1998).
46. See id. at 1194.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 1190.
50. See id. 953 P.2d at 1194-95.
51. See id. at 1195.
52. Id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1985)).
legitimate state interest and was not an unrea-
sonable mistake.53 Categorized as a mere "mis-
taken assertion of jurisdiction,"54 therefore, the
Commission's action did not require compen-
sation.55
In dicta, the majority also responded to the
argument, made by both Landgate and Justice
Brown in dissent, that "the Commission's
actions amount[ed] to a denial of all economi-
cally beneficial use of the land and thus [were]
a categorical taking (citing Lucas) even if only
temporary (citing First English)."56 The majority
distinguished both Lucas and First English by
reasoning that the Commission's action in this
case did not constitute a final decision denying
development.57 The Court, instead, character-
ized the Commission's action as a "postpone-
ment of development pending resolution of a
threshold issue of the development approval
process- whether the lot was legal."58 Since
Lucas and First English did not apply, the major-
ity was free to evaluate whether or not the
delay served a legitimate government purpose,
and to declare that the delay was an "incident
of property ownership."60
Justices Chin and Brown each wrote sepa-
rate dissents, with Justice Baxter joining in
both.61 Justice Chin felt that "[w]hen a regulato-
ry agency prohibits all use of . . . property, and
the property owner is forced to sue the agency
to get it to change its position, its stonewalling
is not fairly characterized as a 'normal delay' in
the permit approval process."62 He observed
that Justice Stevens' dissent in First English
argued that litigation was normal delay, and
was rejected by a majority of the Supreme
Court.63 He also rejected the majority's charac-
terization of the Commission's action as "con-
ditional," instead calling it a final denial of
development "regardless of the circum-
stances."64 Since there was a final denial of all
use, Justice Chin would have held that the
Commission was required to pay compensa-
tion under First English.65
Justice Brown agreed that the
Commission's actions had deprived Landgate
of all use of their property.66 To Justice Brown,
however, this fact ended the inquiry under
Lucas and First English.67 Justice Brown rejected
the way in which the majority distinguished
Lucas and First English, claiming that ripeness
and finality concerns "have no bearing in this
case."68 She accused the Court of being "unwill-
ing to come to terms with the true meaning of
Lucas and First [English]."69 Thus, she rejected
the majority's argument that the Commission's
action served a legitimate government purpose
because it was "precluded by the categorical
rule in Lucas."70 Since Justice Brown decided
that the Commission's actions denied
Landgate all use of its property, she would
have held that compensation was due under
Lucas and First English.71
III. Finality/Ripeness
As the Landgate case suggests, finality and
ripeness issues are a pivotal part of temporary
takings law. In fact, the Landgate case turned, in
part, on the majority's conclusion that the
Commission had not made a final decision.
The difficulty of this aspect of takings law, however,
can be seen in the fact that all three dissenting
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53. See id. at 1195-1200.
54. Id. at 1197.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 1200-01.
57. See id. at 1201-05. This brings up the finality/ripeness
issue, and the Court cites MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,
477 U.S. 340 (1986), in support. Interestingly, the majority does
not really use this issue as a basis for decision, but as a way of
avoiding the necessary results of applying Lucas and First English.
58. Id. at 1202-03.
59. See id. at 1202.
60. See id. at 1204.
61. See id. at 1204-12.
62. Id. at 1205.
63. See id. at 1205-06 (citing First English Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 334 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)).
64. Id. at 1205.
65. See id. at 1206.
66. See id. at 1207-08.
67. See id. at 1209.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1211.
70. Id. at 1210.
71. See id. at 1211-12.
The ultimate question is: when exactly did
the taking begin? This question is especially
important in temporary takings cases because
it becomes necessary to know the exact period
of the taking in order to calculate just compen-
sation.72 For example, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to four cases prior to First
English, attempting each time to reach the
issue of temporary takings, and failing each
time because the cases were not ripe.73
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,74
the Supreme Court outlined finality and
ripeness law with respect to Fifth Amendment
takings. The Court articulated two rules that
come from a long line of cases: (1) the
landowner must have a final decision from the
governing agency concerning the application
of the regulation at issue; and (2) the landown-
er must have sought compensation through
the proper state procedures.75 These rules have
been called "administrative" and "procedural"
ripeness, respectively.76
Administrative ripeness is more helpful in
determining exactly when a taking begins and
essentially requires a final decision regarding
the allowable use of the property. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes laid the foundation for the
final decision requirement when he said that a
regulation could take property if it "goes too
far."77 Since then, the Supreme Court has said
that it cannot know if a regulation goes too far
until it knows how far the regulation goes.78
Thus, the governing agency must have "arrived
at a final, definitive position regarding how it
will apply the regulations at issue to the par-
ticular land in question."79
Getting a final decision, however, is usual-
ly not easy. To begin with, as the Supreme
Court has acknowledged, land use agencies
have a high degree of discretion.80 As a result,
the Court requires that the agency be asked to
use that discretion before it will consider the
agency's decision final.81 Therefore, if a proce-
dure exists to do so, the landowner must
request a variance or other administrative
relief before her claim will be considered ripe.82
In fact, the court has suggested that a
landowner may have to submit multiple pro-
posals if denials are based on overly
"grandiose" development plans.83 Unfortunately,
the Court has left it for the lower courts to
decide exactly how definitive a land use deci-
sion must be before a claim is ripe.84
On this point, however, a fairly obvious rule
can be inferred from Supreme Court holdings
that will probably become well accepted. The
Ninth Circuit has called this rule the "futility
exception."85 The futility exception ripens a
claim at the point when further submissions or
requests for variances would be futile, regard-
less of how definitive an agency's decisions
have been.86 The Ninth Circuit has left to
landowners the task of proving that further
submissions would be futile, but several previ-
ous decisions do give some guidance.87
For example, the Ninth Circuit has held
that landowners do not have to submit to
piecemeal litigation or unfair procedures.88 The
Court has also suggested that the rejection of
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72. The question does have relevance for permanent tak-
ings cases, primarily for the calculation of pre-judgment interest.
See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984).
73. See First English Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 310.
74. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
75. See id. at 734 (citing Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
76. See J. Margaret Tretbar, Calculating Compensation for
Temporary Regulatory Takings, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 201, 208-09 (1993).
77. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922).
78. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 734 (quoting MacDonald, Sommer
& Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986)).
79. Id. at 737 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193).
80. See id. at 738; MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350.
81. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 737 (citing Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981)).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 739 n.12; MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 353 n.9.
84. Cf. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 738.
85. See Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496,
1501 (9th Cir. 1990).
86. See id. at 1501.
87. See id.
88. See id. (citing MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350 n.7).
89. See id. (citing American Savings & Loan Ass’n v. County
of Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981)).
that applying for a variance that the govern-
ment had no power to grant would not be
required.90 Perhaps the most interesting formu-
lation, however, was the statement that "futili-
ty could be shown by establishing that further
pursuit of permission would cause such exces-
sive delay that the property would lose its ben-
eficial use."91
Of course, the finality and ripeness rules
are more easily understood in light of their
application. The best place to start is Agins v.
City of Tiburon,92 decided in 1980. Agins was a
facial challenge to a city zoning ordinance that
severely limited the density of development on
plaintiff's property.93 Though the ordinance did
appear to allow construction of up to five
homes on plaintiff's five acres, Agins never
sought approval from the city for any develop-
ment.94 The Supreme Court held that the claim
was unripe.95
Similarly, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association96 was a facial challenge to
the Surface Mining Act, a federal statute which,
among other things, banned surface coal min-
ing on some of plaintiff's property.97 Unlike the
ordinance at issue in Agins, the Surface Mining
Act did not directly allow any level of coal min-
ing on affected pieces of property; however, it
did have procedures for seeking variances and
waivers from the regulations.98 In addition to
pointing out that non-mining uses might still
be available, the Court held that plaintiffs at
least needed to seek a variance or waiver from
the regulations in order to ripen their claim.99
Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided
Williamson County Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank100 and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County.101 In each of these cases the plaintiffs
went beyond the point held insufficient in Agins
and submitted an application for development
of their property. In each case, the government
denied their applications.105 The Supreme
Court held that each case was unripe, however,
because the plaintiff either had not sought a
variance or had not submitted a second, less
ambitious proposal.104
Finally, in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency105 the Court found the plaintiff's taking
claim ripe.106 In the Lake Tahoe area, Suitum
owned property in what was designated a
Stream Environment Zone (SEZ).107 As a result,
when Suitum applied for a development per-
mit it was denied because no "additional land
coverage or other permanent land disturbance"
was allowed in an SEZ.108 Suitum, however, was
allocated a certain number of transferable
development rights (TDRs) whose value had
yet to be determined.109 The Court decided that
the TDRs were irrelevant to the ripeness of the
claim and held that Suitum's claim was ripe
because "the agency [had] no discretion to
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90. See id. (citing Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d
567, 570 (9th Cir. 1988)).
91. Id. at 1501 (citing Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d
1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1987), modified on other grounds, 830 F.2d 968
(9th Cir. 1987)). This formulation is interesting because it sug-
gests an answer to the problem of unreasonable delay. Perhaps
delay becomes unreasonable when it is so excessive that the
property loses its beneficial use.
92. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
93. See id. at 257-58. In general, the Court does not favor
such facial challenges. In fact, the court has called facial chal-
lenges an "uphill battle." See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987). On the other hand, First
English was a facial challenge that succeeded. See First English
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1997).
Because of the unique procedural posture of First English, howev-
er, the court did not actually hold that a taking had occurred, only
that, if a taking had occurred, compensation was required. See id.
94. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
95. See id. at 262.
96. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
97. See id. at 293-94.
98. See id. at 297.
99. See id. at 296-97.
100. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
101. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
102. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 187; MacDonald, 477
U.S. at 351.
103. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 187-88; MacDonald,
477 U.S. at 351.
104. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193-94; MacDonald,
477 U.S. at 351.
105. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
106. See id. at 739.
107. See id. at 731.
108. Id at 729. (citing TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY
CODE § 20.4).
109. See id. at 741.
110. Id. at 739.
All of these cases help to determine what
has been called the "effective moment"111 of a
taking—that is, the exact moment at which the
taking occurs. One commentator has defined
the effective moment as "the point at which the
landowner's last required variance application
is finally and improperly denied by the highest
administrative body with the power to con-
sent."112 While this is probably the clearest and
most concise definition which can be derived
from Supreme Court holdings, the Landgate
case illustrates that it is still inadequate.
B. The Landgate case: How does litigation
affect the ripeness of a claim?
The Landgate113 case illustrates how the
complexity of real cases makes simple defini-
tions of ripeness problematic. In Landgate the
landowner had essentially received a final
decision from the Coastal Commission,114 but
whether the Commission's decision denied
development is less clear. No development
would be allowed unless the original lot lines
were reestablished, but the Commission was
willing to consider development of the proper-
ty as it was originally configured.115 Since
Landgate believed that this decision was erro-
neous, it was forced to litigate in order to chal-
lenge the Commission's decision.116 After
Landgate won the litigation, however, the
Commission eventually approved construction
of a suitable home.117 Was the Commission's
decision a final denial of all development?
Does it matter that a court overturned this
denial?
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in First English did little to answer the
question of how litigation affects temporary
takings. In fact, his cryptic statement concern-
ing "normal" delay essentially created the
problem.118 On the other hand, the dissent in
Landgate is correct to point out that the ques-
tion was partially answered by the Court's
implicit rejection of Justice Stevens' argument
in dissent that litigation should be considered
a "normal" delay.119 Still, the Court's holding in
First English says only that the government can-
not avoid compensating a landowner by
rescinding its action after a court holds that it
has worked a taking.120 The Court said nothing
about the effect of collateral litigation over the
legitimacy of a permit program, whether or not
the governing agency followed proper proce-
dure, or any other state or local law issue.
After First English the Supreme Court has
not clarified how litigation affects the ripeness
of a claim.121 There is, however, at least one
Federal Circuit case that deals directly with the
issue. In Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States,122 the
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111. See Gregory M. Stein, Pinpointing the Beginning and
Ending of a Temporary Regulatory Taking, 70 WASH. L. REV. 953, 957
(1995).
112. See id. at 970.
113. Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission, 953
P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998).
114. See id. at 1192.
115. See id. at 1193.
116. See id. at 1192-93.
117. See id. at 1194.
118. See First English Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) ("We limit our holding to the
facts presented, and of course do not deal with the quite differ-
ent questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances,
and the like which are not before us.").
119. See Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1205-06 (Chin, J., dissenting)
(quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In
my opinion, . . . [l]itigation challenging the validity of a land use
restriction gives rise to a delay that is just as 'normal' as an
administrative procedure seeking a variance or an approval of a
controversial plan.")).
120. See First English, 482 U.S. at 321 ("We merely hold that
where the government's activities have already worked a taking of
all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period dur-
ing which the taking was effective.").
121. In a 1983 case the Court did suggest an answer to the
problem. See Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1
(1983). In a condemnation case the Court held that "[Penn Central
balancing is] as applicable to . . . when . . . the taking occurs as [it
is] to the problem of ascertaining whether a taking has been
effected by a putative exercise of the police power." Id. at 14
(emphasis in original). Strictly speaking, this holding does not
apply to regulatory takings cases, perhaps because the ripeness
doctrine should stand in its place. That is, when a taking occurs
in the regulatory context should depend on whether or not the
landowner has received a final decision from government. On the
other hand, the Kirby case does suggest that if the finality of a
government decision is confused by intervening litigation, the
Court might fall back on a balancing test. The Kirby opinion, how-
ever, precedes both First English and Lucas where the Court seems
to be moving away from balancing in the Fifth Amendment con-
text. Thus, the current applicability of Kirby is doubtful.
122. 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
to obtain a section 404 permit before filling in
a landlocked wetland.123 After initial attempts
to obtain a permit by negotiating with the
Corps, the developer sued and won a ruling
that the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction had
failed to comply with the Administrative
Procedure Act.124
As a result, Tabb Lakes sued the Corps
claiming a temporary taking for the period dur-
ing which the Corps would not allow it to
develop without a permit.125 The Federal Circuit
held that since the Corps never actually denied
Tabb Lakes a permit, the action was nothing
more than a mistaken assertion of jurisdic-
tion.126 The Corps' actions were characterized
as preliminary regulatory activity, which specif-
ically allows the possibility of a permit.127 The
Court distinguished First English because the
ordinance passed in that case completely
banned development without the possibility of
a permit.128 Consequently, the Court held that
the Corps' mistake in asserting jurisdiction did
not result in a taking.129
The Tabb Lakes case is strikingly similar to
Landgate. Clearly, the majority of the California
Supreme Court found the Federal Circuit
court's reasoning persuasive. On the other
hand, the dissent did not necessarily disagree,
but rather distinguished the Tabb Lakes hold-
ing.130 Perhaps the difficulty in Landgate results
from its unique fact pattern. Whether or not
the Coastal Commission's decision was a final
denial of development depends to an unusual
extent on one's perspective.
If one views the Commission's denial as
conditional, with the reestablishment of the
original lot lines as a "pre-condition to devel-
opment," then there was no final denial and
the Tabb Lakes reasoning applies. On the other
hand, the Commission's decision can also be
seen as a final denial of development on
Landgate, Inc.'s lot as they bought it.131 From this
point of view, as the dissent in Landgate points
out, Tabb Lakes does not apply. Perhaps it was
this unique fact pattern which led the United
States Supreme Court to deny certiorari.
Even so, perhaps a neat conclusion can be
drawn from the Tabb Lakes and Landgate cases.
To begin with, the ripeness cases through
Suitum indicate that the government must
make a final decision regarding development,
having been given every opportunity to exer-
cise whatever discretion they have available.
Until that decision is made, Tabb Lakes and
Landgate suggest that whatever preliminary liti-
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123. See id. at 798. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act gives
the Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction to require permits for
discharging fill material into the navigable waters. See 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1344 (West 1998). The Corps has interpreted this statute to
include wetlands. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1998).
124. See Tabb Lakes, 10 F.3d at 799.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 800-01 (citing United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1985)).
127. See id. at 801.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 803 ("A mistake may give rise to a due
process claim, not a taking claim.").
130. See Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1208 (Brown, J., dissenting).
See also id. at 1210 ("Of course mere 'delay' in a 'process' resulting
from an 'erroneous decision' does not qualify as a constitutional
violation.").
131. From a practical point of view the dissent's position
may be more reasonable. Apparently, reconfiguring the lot lines
was highly undesirable because the original house straddled the
two original lots. As a result, and because of the thinness of the
original lots, building a house on one lot above the road was fair-
ly unrealistic. Telephone interview with Joseph Barbieri, supra
note 14.
132. Very few courts have ruled on the issue of extraordi-
nary delay and when exactly that, by itself, causes a taking. Most
courts that have ruled on the issue simply held that the delay was
not extraordinary without much discussion. See 1902 Atlantic Ltd.
v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 575, 581 (1992). Those courts that have
discussed the issue, however, have suggested evaluating the
agency's action for necessity, diligence, and bad faith. See
Anaheim Gardens v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 24, 37 (1995) (cit-
ing Dufau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156, 163-64 (1990)). The
"futility exception," discussed above, is another way courts have
dealt with such problems. See supra Part III.A.
It seems likely that by "extraordinary delay" the Supreme
Court had in mind Justice Brennan's concerns, voiced in his San
Diego Gas & Electric v. San Diego dissent, that agencies that lose pre-
liminary litigation will make minor, bad faith changes to their
decisions in order to stop development by keeping it tied up in
court, while at the same time avoiding a takings judgment. See 450
U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
DELONG, supra note 1, at 296-302 (giving a detailed account of
the problems that concerned Justice Brennan). At the time,
Justice Brennan used this type of situation to argue strenuously
for the establishment of a temporary takings doctrine, and the
doctrine eventually established by First English was, no doubt,
intended to address Justice Brennan's concerns. Furthermore,
Justice Rehnquist's comment, in First English, regarding "extraor-
dinary delay" was probably intended to catch whatever clever
administrative abuses that were not deterred by the possibility of
a temporary takings judgment.
taking except in extraordinary cases involving
regulatory abuses and unusual delay.132 Finally,
First English conveys the message that once a
final decision is made, if there is a taking, then
the landowner is entitled to compensation.
Even if the agency prevails on some other
aspect of the litigation, such as a procedural
matter, compensation should still be due.
The temporary takings doctrine estab-
lished by First English has made the finality or
ripeness doctrine especially important.
Therefore, using the final decision point for
temporary takings makes sense. Land use
agencies cannot fairly operate if every prelimi-
nary decision they make, which has the effect
of temporarily denying development, might
result in a substantial damage award if it is
overturned by a court.133 On the other hand,
once a final decision is made, it seems reason-
able to force the agency to stand by it. Perhaps
this will result in more careful decision making.
IV. Remedies
Once a court has determined that compen-
sation is due for a temporary taking, it remains
a challenge to calculate the appropriate dam-
ages. Again, the Landgate case illustrates how
this can become a difficult problem. The trial
court in Landgate was presented with at least
four different theories on how to calculate
damages.134 At one extreme, Landgate, Inc.'s
theory would have resulted in an award greater
than the original market value of the property.135
At the other extreme was the Commission's
argument that no damages were due at all.136
As an initial matter, even permanent tak-
ings have various problems associated with
calculating damages. One problem is defining
the exact property which has been taken.
Obviously, the amount of property taken can
affect the amount of damages due. This is
called the "denominator problem." A second
problem arises with defining exactly what has
been taken. Has the value of the property been
taken, or has the property been deprived of all
beneficial use? Though it is possible that both
formulations might amount to the same thing,
they are not the same and can result in sub-
stantially different damages awards. Both of
these problems are exacerbated by the nature
of temporary takings.
A. General Problems With Calculating
Damages
1. Diminution in Value v. Economically
Viable Use
A given piece of real estate137 can produce a
return on an investment in two ways: (1) vari-
ous market forces can cause the market value
of the property to increase faster than inflation;
and (2) various uses of the property, such as
mining or development, can independently
produce a return. These two aspects of proper-
ty value are highly dependent on each other
and as a result, land use regulations, which pri-
marily affect the uses of a piece of property,
can have a dramatic affect on market value.
When this happens, which aspect of the prop-
erty's value has been taken? Which is compen-
sable?
For eminent domain and other physical
appropriations cases the government must pay
the market value of the property which has
been taken, no matter how small.138 Regulatory
takings cases present a problem, however,
because the government cannot be forced to
pay every time a land use regulation reduces













133. See Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1204.
134. See Opening Brief for Appellant California Coastal
Commission at 7-9, Landgate, (No. B084315).
135. See id. at 8-9.
136. See id. at 7.
137. This note's discussion of this topic focuses on real
estate even though the Fifth Amendment protects all kinds of
property. Though problems with the distinction between value
and economically viable uses can affect many types of property,
real estate creates the most problems because the two are so
interconnected. In addition, temporary takings most often
involve real estate, and therefore most of the cases that illustrate
the problem deal with real estate.
138. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (awarding compensation for a TV cable
which a city ordinance required the landowner allow on her prop-
erty).
139. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922) ("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law.").
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result, the Court has repeatedly held that a
"diminution in property value, standing alone."
is not enough to establish a taking.140 Even the
most restrictive regulations, however, leave the
affected property with some residual market
value.141 This fact, combined with the assump-
tion that a regulatory taking required the trans-
fer of the entire fee,142 meant that finding a reg-
ulatory taking was rare.
Recently, the Court has moved toward a
policy of looking to the use aspect of value to
determine when a regulation works a taking.
For example, the Court has established a cate-
gorical rule that when a property has been
deprived of all "economically viable use" it has
been taken per se.143 This rule applies even
though a property with no economically viable
use may still hold substantial market value.144
Unfortunately, some justices do not distin-
guish between market value and economically
viable use, and as a consequence the Court's
views on this subject have been less than con-
sistent.145
A possible solution to this problem has
been adopted by the Federal Circuit. The
Federal Circuit has rejected any implicit focus
on the use of property, arguing that physical
appropriation and regulatory takings cases
should be treated the same.146 Furthermore, in
order to solve problems with allowing for some
land use regulation while also dealing with
potentially significant residual property values,
the Federal Circuit adopted "partial takings."147
The Federal Circuit's test suggests that a court
should use Penn Central balancing to determine
whether a given regulation works a taking, and
then award compensation only for the reduc-
tion in market value caused by the regula-
tion.148 If any interest transfers to the govern-
ment it should be only that interest taken, not
the entire fee.149
Unfortunately, the conceptual difficulty
between use and market value in regulatory
takings has created problems for temporary
takings. The difficulty arises when a regulatory
restriction is lifted: the property returns to its
original market value plus or minus any
changes in the market that have occurred in
the interim. As a result, using a straight market
value approach such as that suggested by the
Federal Circuit, leaves the landowner with vir-
tually no compensation.
At the opposite extreme, the Supreme
Court in First English suggested using the use of
the property to measure compensation in the
same way that is done in temporary physical
appropriations cases.150 This means the govern-
ment must pay a fair rental value for the inter-
est taken for whatever time the regulation is in













140. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 131 (1978); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980)
("Mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental
decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay . . . cannot be con-
sidered as a 'taking’.").
141. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18
F.3d 1560, 1565-68 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (even though the Army Corps
of Engineers had prohibited any development by denying a sec-
tion 404 permit to fill the wetland which made up the property, a
highly speculative market still valued the property at approxi-
mately $4000 per acre).
142. See id. In Florida Rock the majority argues that no tak-
ings require the transfer of an interest in the land taken, while the
dissent argues that takings always require the transfer of the
entire fee. See also San Diego Gas & Electric v. San Diego, 450 U.S.
621,  651-53 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a regu-
latory taking does not require the transfer of the fee).
143. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1016 (1992). See also First English Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 320-21 (acknowledging that fluctuations
in value cannot work a taking, and then holding that compensa-
tion is required for a taking of "all use").
144. Arguably this was the case in Lucas.  505 U.S. at 1034
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing doubt that Mr. Lucas' lot
had lost all value); id. at 1043-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (point-
ing out that no evidence had been heard on the property's value,
and that the property retained a variety of uses). It was definitely
the case in Landgate. See Coastal Commission's Appellate Court
Brief at 26, Landgate (No. B08 4315).
145. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (characterizing the categorical rule as requiring a "finding of
no value"). Justice Scalia was actually fairly consistent with his
"no economically viable use" formulation. However, all four of the
Justices who wrote separately, Justice Kennedy in concurrence
and Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter in dissent, focused on
the value of the property instead.
146. See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1569. Accord San Diego Gas &
Electric v. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 651-53  (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan's dissent has been widely followed because the
bulk of his opinion had the support of five justices and was later
implicitly adopted by the Court's opinion in First English. See, e.g.,
Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 505 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985).
147. See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568-73.
148. See id. at 1570-71.
149. See id. at 1571-72.
150. See First English Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
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temporary regulatory takings usually involve
undeveloped property for which there is no
legitimate rental market. Consequently,
landowners often try to charge the government
for the fair rental value of the proposed development.151
Thus, when using this method of calculating
damages, compensation can quickly exceed
the market value of the property.152 This would
result in an absurd award, given that the gov-
ernment could have permanently taken the
entire fee and paid only the market value.
As a result, in temporary takings, calculat-
ing damages based on the market value does
not work because it does not award enough
damages to protect property rights sufficiently.
Using the use value, or a fair rental value, is
also inappropriate because it too often results
in a windfall for landowners and provides too
much incentive to claim a taking. Thus, a new
type of calculation is required.
2. The Denominator Problem
The denominator problem was not at issue
in Landgate, but it is an important problem and
deserves a brief mention. The denominator
problem arises when a regulation affects only a
portion, or a particular aspect, of a piece of
property.153 For example, a regulation might
affect only ten acres out of a hundred, or
restrict coal mining while allowing other uses.
Since the traditional Supreme Court balancing
test evaluates takings, in part, by comparing
the value taken from the property with the
value that remains, the way in which a
landowner characterizes her loss can make a
big difference in the outcome.154 The Court's
move from a market value focus to economi-
cally viable use in Agins155 and Lucas exacerbat-
ed the problem because a landowner can more
easily prove that her property has lost all eco-
nomically viable use than prove that it has lost
all value.
Historically, the Supreme Court's answer to
this problem has been the "whole parcel"
rule.156 The whole parcel rule eliminates the
denominator problem by evaluating takings
using the entire parcel, including all of the
associated rights.157 Using this doctrine, the
Supreme Court has expressly disapproved of
dividing an affected parcel in order to charac-
terize a discrete segment as having lost all
value.158
In spite of the whole parcel rule, the
denominator problem creates a unique situa-
tion for temporary takings. Permanent regula-
tory takings created less incentive for creative
maneuvering of property lines, because the
government ended up purchasing the fee.
Since regulations almost never render property
entirely without a market value, it is often more
worthwhile to hold on to the property for its
speculative value.159 This is true primarily
because a lawsuit is likely to cost a landowner
thousands of dollars in legal fees, and the gov-
ernment is likely to turn around and sell the
property to someone else at a reduced price.160
Temporary takings completely remove this
disincentive. If a landowner can characterize
her property as having lost all economically
viable use, she can potentially rake in a signif-
icant windfall. Since the government does not
take the property, and ends up rescinding the
regulation, the landowner could end up with
both developable property and a substantial
damages award. Many jurisdictions put icing
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151. See Tretbar, supra note 76, at 219-24.
152. This would have happened in the Landgate case,
except that the trial court rejected this method of computing
damages. See Coastal Commission's Appellate Court Brief at 8-9,
Landgate (No. B084315). A similar situation happened in Yuba
Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
where the court used the fair rental value to calculate damages,
but rejected the enormous damages requested by the property
owners for lost profits.
153. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (describing the denominator problem and
considering what effect the categorical rule will have on it). See also
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497 (1987).
154. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496-97.
155. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
156. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S.
602, 643-44 (1993).
157. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31; Concrete Pipe, 508
U.S. at 644.
158. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 644.
159. Perhaps down the road a new administration will
change the regulations and allow development.
160. This is exactly what happened to Mr. Lucas. See
DELONG, supra note 1, at 296.
and costs.161 Since it is probably fair to assume
that most landowners are legitimately harmed
and not merely trying to rake in a windfall, this
problem makes the way the court calculates
damages especially important.
B. A Potential Solution
As a result of the above concerns, a few
courts have tried to find a middle ground. Of
course, the object is to secure adequate com-
pensation for injured landowners, while also
avoiding awards that are inappropriate windfalls.
For the most part the specifics of damages cal-
culation does not reach the appellate level very
often. Those cases that have are mostly found
in the state courts, and have produced incon-
sistent results. Two federal courts of appeals,
however, have addressed the issue and are in
essential agreement. Their approach has been
called the "market rate of return" method.163
In Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove (Wheeler
III)164 the court began its discussion by deciding
that in a temporary taking the landowner's
injury is a loss of the income producing or prof-
it potential of the property.165 Though this sug-
gests an economic use-based theory, the mar-
ket rate of return method is based on market
value.166 Theoretically, any loss in use will be
reflected in the change in market value, and so
compensating landowners for the loss of use
separately would amount to a double recov-
ery.167 Simply stated, the market rate of return
method provides landowners with a return on
the property's fair market value that was tem-
porarily lost as a result of the regulation.168
Therefore, an award using this method should
be calculated by taking the property's market
value prior to the regulation, subtracting the
market value after the regulation, and then
awarding a market rate of return on the differ-
ence computed over the period of the taking.169
One major criticism of this method is that
it is too generalized.170 It fails to take any pecu-
liarities of the specific circumstances into
account. In response, some courts have
attempted to modify the market rate of return
method to make it more case specific. For
example, the Northern District of California
modified the test by factoring in the probabili-
ty that the landowner's development would be
legitimately denied by the agency.171 On a
fourth appeal, the Wheeler court actually calcu-
lated the damages itself, and modified its own
test by factoring in the landowners' loan obli-
gations and calculating damages using the
remaining equity interest.172 There are concep-
tual problems with both of these modifica-
tions, and neither has been widely accepted.173
Again, the Landgate case is a nice illustra-
tion of the market rate of return method and its
pitfalls. First, the trial court valued Landgate's
property at $675,000 before the Commission's
permit denial.174 Then, it decided that the
Commission's denial of a development permit
rendered Landgate's property without eco-
nomically viable use, and thus valueless.175 The
difference between the two values, then, was
the entire $675,000.176 The trial court then used
a ten percent rate of return over a two year
period, added property taxes plus interest, and
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161. This was exactly the state of things when the Landgate
case reached the California Supreme Court. See Coastal Commission's
Appellate Court Brief at 9, Landgate (No. B084315); Landgate, Inc.
v. California Coastal Comm’n, 953 P.2d 1188, 1193 (Cal. 1998).
162. See Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267
(11th Cir. 1987); Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502 (8th
Cir. 1985) (calculating damages for a temporary taking in a case
which precedes First English by relying on Justice Brennan's dis-
sent in San Diego Gas & Electric).
163. See Tretbar, supra note 76, at 227.
164. 833 F.2d 267. The Wheeler case made its way to the
Eleventh Circuit four times, but only the last two dealt with the
calculation of damages.





170. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 790 F. Supp. 909,
915 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
171. See id. at 915; see also Tretbar, supra note 76, at 232-36.
172. See Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 896 F.2d 1347,
1351-52 (11th Cir. 1990).
173. See Tretbar, supra note 76, at 232, 236.




177. See id.; Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal
Commission, 953 P.2d 1188, 1193( Cal. 1998).
For the most part, the market rate of return
method provides a good estimate of what a
property owner loses in a temporary takings
case. In Landgate, however, the trial court
reached a result that was probably too high.
This is because the court equated a taking of
all economically viable use with the market
value of the property. The categorical rule from
Lucas should only be applied in deciding
whether or not the regulation works a taking.
Once that is decided, it is better to use the
changes in market value as the measure of
compensation. The Fifth Amendment provides
compensation for the taking of property. The
government does not owe compensation
under that amendment because it has prohib-
ited some behavior on a landowner's property.
Rather, compensation is due when the govern-
ment has prohibited so much behavior that it
may as well have invaded the property out-
right. Thus, compensation is due for the value
of the property, not the value of whatever
behavior the regulation prohibited.
V. Conclusion
Research on this paper was begun with the
assertion that temporary takings law is seri-
ously flawed. As a practical matter, however, it
appears that it would not be prudent to over-
rule First English or eliminate the temporary tak-
ings concept. The regulatory abuses that the
temporary takings doctrine is designed to
address, no doubt, exist and cannot be
ignored. The conclusion drawn is that tempo-
rary takings law is not inherently "screwed up,"
but rather it is flawed in its application. As a
result, a few suggestions can be made.
First, ripeness doctrine with respect to
temporary takings needs to be clarified.
Preliminary litigation that comes before a final
agency decision should not, by itself, result in
a taking. Instead, the Court should explicitly
approve and more clearly define the "futility
exception." This clarity should be enough to
prevent bad faith agency behavior, and keep
hapless landowners from being subjected to
repeated litigation or extraordinary delay. Once
a final agency decision is made, or further
application held to be futile, then compensa-
tion should be due for any property held to
have been taken.
Secondly, the confusion between market
value and economically beneficial use will con-
tinue to create inconsistent lower court rulings
until it is clarified by the Supreme Court. The
Court should either abandon Lucas' categorical
rule, or alter it to require a finding of zero mar-
ket value. This would make the rule more con-
sistent with the rest of takings law and reduce
confusion in damages awards.
There is no question that economically
viable uses are an important part of property
ownership, but the Fifth Amendment does not
compensate for the loss of those uses. Thus, if
the Court insists on keeping the formulation, it
should drop the per se rule and add it as a fac-
tor to the Penn Central balancing test. In so
doing, it should then follow the Federal
Circuit's lead and explicitly allow for partial
regulatory takings. This approach would make
regulatory takings more consistent with other
types of takings and further reduce confusion
in calculating compensation. Furthermore, it
would allow the government to purchase only
those property rights in which it has a legiti-
mate interest, and leave the rest to private
investment.
With such a system in place, temporary
takings litigation would not be encouraged by
a convenient categorical test, which practically
every permit denial arguably satisfies. Instead,
each situation could be evaluated using the
temporary nature of the government action as
one factor. Of course, this approach does noth-
ing to eliminate the uncertainty in the
Supreme Court's confused takings jurispru-
dence, but categorical rules will not do that
either. Societal needs, interests, and views on
property rights protection necessarily change
over time. As a result, nice square categorical
rule pegs are eventually confronted with a
bunch of round holes. Inevitably, it is the rules














Jon Lycett Volume 7, Number 1
